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THE NATURE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
WILLIAM M. HEPBURN* and PIERRE R. LOISEAUX**
Lawyers, law schools and the American public have become acutely
conscious of the arbitration process generally, and in connection with
labor-management disputes in particular, only within the past genera-
tion. Today, however, our industrial society could hardly function
without this remarkable device for the settlement of controversies
between employers and unions, and employees. One writer has com-
mented that the grievance and arbitration procedure in collective
bargaining agreements
... represents one of the most significant developments in the jurispru-
dence of the twentieth century. If this statement seems carelessly broad,
consideration should be given to the fact that there are perhaps today
more private disputes being resolved daily under provisions [for arbi-
tration] ... than are being handled in all state and federal courts in the
country.'
Nevertheless, in spite of its relatively new prominence in our society,
arbitration is an old concept. Elkouri comments that:
Arbitration as an institution is not new, having been in use many centuries
before the beginning of the English common law. King Solomon was one
of the earliest arbitrators, and it is interesting to note that the procedure
used by him was in many respects similar to that used by arbitrators
today.2
It may be doubted whether the technique of splitting the difference
as between the disputants actually appeals to many participants in
labor-management disputes, but it is true that arbitration is not new
and untried, but has ancient and respectable origins.
In Judge Cardozo's classic The Nature of the Judicial Process3
that famous judge examines the elements of a judicial decision-The
Method of Philosophy, The Methods of History, Tradition and So-
ciology; The Judge as Legislator; Adherence to Precedent; The Sub-
conscious Elements in the Judicial Process. The arbitrator's task
is similar to that of the judge, but still quite different. Perhaps the
chief difference is that the arbitrator is freer, and therefore carries
heavier responsibilities than the judge. He is not only a judge, al-
though a private one, but jury as well, and often legislator; from him
there is usually no appeal; and the consequences of his decisions are
*Dean and Professor of Law, Emory University.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. MATTHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 345 (1953).
2. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 2 (1952).
3. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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often large in terms of money, and far-reaching in their effects on
many people, and on industrial policies. The marvel is that manage-
ment and labor will entrust to an individual, often a stranger to them
both, final determination of very vital issues. And that cases are rare
in which an arbitrator's decision is challenged is an extraordinary
tribute to the institution of arbitration itself, and to the basic integrity
of American management and labor.
It may be doubted whether parties always understand the difficulties
of the arbitrator's task. Pearce Davis has said:
Arbitrators are characteristically lonely men. They ordinarily have no
relations with the parties before a hearing, save for the formal mechanics
of arranging for it. They analyze the evidence, meditate, make their de-
cision in solitude, set down their reasons in the presence only of pen and
paper, and silently dispatch their opinion and award. Arbitrators seldom
see or communicate with the parties subsequent to the hearing.4
About 90 per cent of the collective bargaining contracts now in
force in this country provide for the submission of unsettled grievances
to arbitration.5 Some select an arbitrator for each unsettled grievance
and others establish a permanent arbitrator or umpire. Some contracts
name a panel of three or more arbitrators, who are assigned in rotation.
To the uninitiated some of these grievances may seem to involve small
disputes and relatively unimportant matters. However, almost every
grievance that comes to arbitration is important. There are indeed
seemingly petty cases which reach arbitration, but examination will
usually reveal that what appears to be a case of small importance is
economically significant not only to the parties to the dispute but
very often to the public. For example, a grievant claims that under
the terms of the contract he is entitled to eleven days of paid vacation
rather than ten, as the company had figured. This employee receives
an hourly rate that makes the day's pay in question come to about ten
dollars. It might seem strange that the company should fly a lawyer
from their distant home office to present the case, and that the union
should bring an international representative from another city. How-
ever, when it appears that the company has twenty thousand employ-
ees working under this contract in a dozen different plants, is it strange
that they do not wish to settle this case which could involve $200,000,
without making their best effort? Not only will the preparation and
the hearing be important, but in all probability the parties will file
4. Address by Pearce Davis, The Arbitration Process Today and the Func-
tion of the Industrial Engineer, 20th National Time and Motion Study and
Management Clinic, Nov. 1, 1956.
5. In a study of 1,442 collective agreements in effect during 1952, the Bureau
of Labor Standards found that 89% of the contracts, covering workers in 29
broad industrial categories, contained provisions relating to the arbitration
of grievances. Moore and Nix, Arbitration Provisions in Collective Agree-
ments, 1952, 76 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 261 (1953).
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extensive briefs after the hearing. The importance of this case may
be obvious, but in many arbitration cases the significance of the de-
cision is equally great, but less apparent. In some, little money is in-
dispute, but important policy matters, such as seniority provisions,
may affect the welfare of employees and the conduct of business.
In addition to an unknown number of grievance arbitrations being
heard each day there are occasional cases of what are usually called
contract or interest arbitrations. Generally, in this situation, the
agreement to arbitrate is not made in a collective bargaining con-
tract, but is made by an ad hoc stipulation and agreement to arbitrate
particular matters which the parties are unable to settle in their ne-
gotiations. The importance of the award in contract arbitration can
hardly be overstated, particularly when wages and fringe benefits are
in issue. The granting of an increase or decrease in hourly wages will
involve large sums of money. Five cents an hour can amount to more
than $100 a year for each employee. A small plant employing 100
must pay $10,000 a year for a 4 cent increase. The award in some
cases will also have an important effect upon the national economy.
In the past twenty-five years the use of arbitration in the labor-
management field has grown to an extraordinary degree and there is
every reason today to believe that this growth will continue.6 Reasons
for this growth can be summarized in a phrase-convenient necessity.
To the parties, arbitration offers solutions to vexing and frequently
explosive problems. Without such a decision-making process the
parties might be forced into economic warfare or litigation. Neither
is desirable. Arbitration offers speed, relative economy, and flexibility.
Litigation is unsatisfactory to the parties because of great expense,
undesired technicality and delay. The public interest would suffer if
courts were required to decide many thousands of disputes between
management and labor, which would impede the traditional work of
courts. Moreover, the regular courts are not equipped to handle a
large proportion of cases that now go to arbitration. Economic war-
fare, the other alternative in addition to litigation available to parties
who do not agree to arbitrate their unsolved problems, is in almost
every case unsatisfactory and in general productive only of tragic
economic waste and personal hardship. Equally important in consider-
ing alternatives is the nature of the result sought. In litigation the
parties are compelled to fit their frequently unique questions into
established legal doctrine. A suit for breach of contract between labor
and management must fit traditional patterns, parties must play
their proper doctrinal parts, and the court is limited in the type and
scope of remedy which it can award. This economically and socially
sensitive continuing relationship could not stand the strain if it were
6. See WrTTE, -IIsTORICAL SURVEY or LABOR ARBITRATION (Labor Relations
Series, U. Pa. Press 1952).
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necessary to use our historical legal processes to solve every dispute.
Thus, today, because of necessity and convenience, labor and man-
agement have by agreement established a procedure for settling dis-
putes which includes their own forum and their own private judges,
or arbitrators. How do the parties find these private judges? Obviously
it is necessary to choose someone upon whom the parties can agree.
What are the formal qualifications for this work? The only essential
qualification is an ability to understand the dispute and to make a
"fair," rational and dispassionate decision. For this task parties have
selected business men, lawyers, ministers, engineers, sociologists,
economists, and, in particular controversies, persons from almost
every walk of life. University professors with training in law, busi-
ness, economics or sociology are very frequently appointed. All peo-
ple are judges in various ways-decision making is a part of life
from which few escape. However, as the number of labor arbitrations
has increased many persons who have proved satisfactory as arbi-
trators have been frequently reappointed. Some of these have become
professional arbitrators and have given up other vocations to devote
all of their time to the arbitration process.7 At the present time there
are doubtlessly more persons serving as arbitrators on an occasional
basis than there are permanent arbitrators.
The parties select the arbitrator by agreement, or accept one ap-
pointed by some agreed-upon third party. The third party may be a
state or federal agency, the American Arbitration Association, or
some other organization or person. Occasionally the contract will pro-
vide that a federal judge, the governor of the state, or the president
of a university shall select the arbitrator, but such provisions are
usually in new contracts and the parties soon change to one of the
established sources of appointment. An appointing agency does not
ordinarily name the arbitrator individually, unless requested spe-
cifically to do so. A list of qualified persons is submitted by the
agency to both sides, and the parties strike names which are un-
acceptable and number the remaining names in order of preference.
The agency then names the individual with the lowest total as arbi-
trator. Permanent umpires in major industries are well known, but
even in such permanent appointments few are full-time professional
arbitrators.
In the broadest sense, what both parties want from their private
judge is a fair and practical decision. Frequently the arbitrator is sore
pressed to know exactly what and how much he is to decide. At
times the parties are not fully aware of the basis of their dispute,
and the arbitrator must initially decide that issue. Some contracts
7. Information on the occupational status of arbitrators is available in the
cumulative "Directory of Arbitrators" published as an appendix to BNA's
Labor Arbitration Reports.
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provide for this. However, the arbitrator must make a decision even
if it is only that he cannot make a decision on the substantive ques-
tion.8 What does the arbitrator bring with him to the arbitration
hearing? Unlike the judge in legal procedures, often the arbitrator
does not know the nature of the dispute he will be called upon to
determine. If he has knowledge of industrial techniques and personnel
policies he will be better able to accomplish the initial task of learning.
By what process does an arbitrator reach a decision? Probably no
two follow identical rules. Often the same individual varies his
method. That judges follow no definite formula seems evident. The
methods of philosophy, history, tradition, sociology which Cardozo
discussed are not foreign to the arbitrator; nor is precedent or reliance
upon the subconscious. He quoted Munroe Smith that:
The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final
truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in the great lab-
oratories of the law, the courts of justice. Every new case is an ex-
periment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a re-
sult which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. 9
Probably, the first thing a judge or arbitrator does is to obtain as
a complete an understanding of the facts as he can from the parties'
opening statements, testimony, summations and briefs; then he sets
up tentative questions and thinks in terms of possible answers, in
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, practical knowledge,
sense of justice. He must allocate various pieces of information to
different sides of the formulated questions and assign some relative
value to each. The final step usually involves a choice between two
or more alternatives, but this is not always so. There are cases, for
example, where the facts and the contract are so clear that only
one answer is possible. For at times, both management and labor arbi-
trate cases which are clearly without merit, and the arbitrator's func-
tion, and it is a useful one to the parties, is to serve as whipping boy.
But when the arbitrator must choose between alternatives, quite often
a subjective element on a narrow point may lead him to his decision.
What are the arbitrator's tools? His authority comes from the col-
lective bargaining agreement, plus the submission or stipulation, if
there is one. Frequently the grievance is submitted, and the question
is: What disposition shall be made of it under the contract? Very
often the terms of the contract do not give a ready answer to the ques-
tion or dispute that has been brought to the arbitrator. If there were
a ready answer in the contract the case would usually have been
settled during the grievance steps.
8. See Justin, Arbitrability and the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction, in McKELVEY,
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS (1956).




In making a decision what criteria are available to the arbitrator,
what criteria does he use, and what criteria does he say he uses? The
theme of this paper is that grievance arbitration in general follows the
"law" and that the arbitrator functions principally as a judge.10
In comparing an arbitrator with a judge it is necessary to ascertain
what sort of a judge is to be used as a standard of measure. Shall
we compare the trial judge in a civil court with the arbitrator, or might
we better take the criminal judge, or are there aspects of the arbi-
trator's action which would tend to have us select an appellate judge?
Actually in most cases the arbitrator acts in a dual capacity: during
the conduct of the hearing he is functioning primarily as a judge in
ordinary civil proceedings. If we were to attend some hearings it
would be difficult to distinguish without knowing ahead that this man
sitting in a court room was not an ordinary civil judge hearing a
jury-waived trial. On the other hand we might go into the conference
room of some corporation and have a hard job distinguishing this
activity from a committee meeting or an early step in a standard
grievance procedure. Sometimes the flavor of the hearing may be
much more that of criminal proceedings with the conduct in question
such that if true as alleged the company would not only have just
cause to discharge this person, but in all probability he is being, or
will be, prosecuted by the law enforcement authorities. However,
the essence of the arbitrator's dual capacity is that after the hearing
he in effect sits as an appellate judge in making his final determination.
This is particularly true if he first issues a tentative award, inviting the
comments and criticism of the parties.
It is not uncommon to make a record of the hearing in cases of
importance. In many disputes the parties file briefs after the hearing.
This post-hearing document smacks of both a closing argument and
an appellate brief. It contains argument about the facts presented
and their weight and applications such as is usual in closing argument,
but it also contains extensive argument about the major premise
10. "... arbitration, except as provided by statute, is solely a creature of the
parties. If the parties prefer an arbitrator to function as a 'mutual friend,'
as a labor relations psychiatrist, or as a father-confessor, they are privileged
to seek out an arbitrator who can fulfill such a role. If they prefer an arbitra-
tor to adhere strictly to the traditional quasi-judicial approach, this can be
made clear. It is important to the success of the relationship that the parties
understand and agree upon the type of arbitration they want and that they
make this clear to the arbitrator. Personally, I continue to hold the view that
in grievance arbitration the- arbitrator's function is properly a quasi-judicial
one." Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Appraisal, 9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
85, 88 (1955). See also Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes,
49 MIcH. L. REV. 787 (1951); Warren and Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbi-
tration, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 200 (1950); Braden, The Function of the Ar-
bitrator in Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARE. J. (n.s.) 35 (1949); Singer,
Labor Arbitration: Should it be Formal or Informal?, 2 LAB. L.J. 89 (1951);
Hoebrecx, In Defense of Judicial Arbitration, 3 LAB. L.J. 487 (1952); Code of
Ethics and Procedural Standards for Labor-Management Arbitration, Part 1,
§ 1 (AAA 1950).
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under which these facts are to be placed. This argument of principles
involves at times extensive use of legal sources, industrial statistics,
other arbitration proceedings, state and federal statutes, practice and
custom in industry or in a particular industry, and sometimes an ele-
ment of emotion.
In making his decision the arbitrator then has a record of the hearing
and written argument. He usually writes an opinion to accompany
his award, and the parties expect this. An arbitration award is not
merely the settlement of a dispute. Often it forms a rule or interpre-
tation for the parties' future conduct, and they must live with it. In
this last phase of the decision-making process the arbitrator is func-
tioning in many respects as an appellate judge. By this it is not meant
to imply that the trial judge has no copy of the record before he
renders judgment, or that he is powerless either to call for briefing of
the questions or to write his opinion on particular questions at great
length. However, all this is somewhat unusual for most state court
judges.
There are no pleadings in an arbitration proceeding, although the
grievance and the company's answer may be analogous to pleadings
when no submission is executed. The trial judge has the pleadings
before him at the commencement of the trial and from these he can
understand the theory of the plaintiff's case and the nature of the
defendant's defense. The arbitrator will normally have a single paper
-the Submission or Stipulation to Arbitrate. This does not always re-
veal the theory of the complaining party's case or the nature of pos-
sible defenses. The pleadings in a law suit set the limits of the argu-
ment and the scope of the proof to be made; often the stipulation in
the arbitration proceeding does not serve either of these sometimes
important functions.
It is not uncommon in industrial disputes to give the arbitrator a
jointly conducted tour of the premises to show him the overall opera-
tion of the plant before the hearing is commenced. Although the
judge is sometimes authorized to view the situs in question in civil
litigation it is the exception rather than the rule for him to do so.
In important arbitration proceedings there is a genuine attempt to
educate the arbitrator on all phases of the question which he is to
decide. In litigation there are may rules of procedure and evidence
designed to prevent the judge from knowing certain aspects of the
case. Also the arbitration hearing has a psychological value.
The factors mentioned above describe two basic differences. The
first is that parties to arbitration proceedings have more confidence
in the "judge," they are more willing to entrust him with their
problem without formal limitations, in part because they have had
a direct part in his selection. The second difference is basic to the
1957 ]
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field of labor relations-the parties are, unlike litigants, in a continuing
relationship. The judge has served his function if the result is such
that there will be no breach of the peace following his determination,
i.e., the parties do not have to accept the determination except to the
extent that they will refrain from taking further action against the
other person. On the other hand, in arbitration the award must be
accorded a higher degree of acceptability." The parties must not
only be able to live with the award as such, but they must be able
to live with the award and each other at the same time-this can be
very difficult.
Outside these enumerated distinctions the actual decision making is
very much the same in arbitration as it is in litigation. In so much
as the process is the same, do arbitrators behave like judges, do
they reach the same conclusions when faced by similar questions?
The Arbitrator shall be governed wholly by the terms of this agreement
and shall have no power to add to or change its terms.
The above provision or one substantially like it is standard in con-
temporary collective bargaining contracts. It is common in today's
labor contracts for the parties to provide that the employer shall not
discharge any of the employees subject to the agreement except for
"just cause." If an employee's discharge is challenged and the case
goes to arbitration on the claim that the employer did not have
just cause for his action, it is impossible for him to make a determina-
tion of the case without filling in the terms of the contract. Thereafter
the term "just cause" will either include or exclude certain conduct
-the term just cause has been added to, no matter what determina-
tion is made. Likewise, the company and the union may disagree as
to what the term "layoff" means.12 The company may have thought
that it meant one thing and the union may have thought that it
meant another-both parties acting in good faith. Eventually the
arbitrator will decide which, if either, of these interpretations is
"correct" and when he does so he has changed the terms of the
contract for at least one of the two parties. We can, with the older
jurisprudes, take the pseudo-logical approach that the term "layoff"
meant what the arbitrator says it meant all along; therefore, the
contract was in no way changed-but in this age of "realism" we
would fool few.
Do the parties put this clause in the contract knowing that it is often
an impossible mandate? In all probability the parties do not consider
the application of such a provision in varying circumstances. However,
it may be that a very useful function is served by way of caution or
11. See SIimvN, ACCEPTABILITY AS A FACTOR IN ARBITRATION UNDER AN EXIST-
ING AGREEMENT (Labor Relations Series, U. Pa. Press 1952).
12. See Universal Winding Company, 14 LAB. ARB. 869 (1950) (Healy).
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warning to the decision-maker, the arbitrator-he is put on notice
that he is not employed to bargain for the parties and further that
insofar as particular provisions are made the parties mean what they
say.
THE ARBITRATOR'S ToOLS
The arbitrator is appointed to make a decision that is not usually
apparent to the parties from the express provisions of the contract.
What criteria for its construction and application are available? Does
the arbitrator's written opinion reveal what standards were used in
arriving at the conclusion announced? Does the arbitrator know in
every case what factors guided his choice between possible alterna-
tives?
The most convenient place to start would be with the published
opinions accompanying awards made in arbitration cases. From this
source we can ascertain what the arbitrator says guides his choice,
and then later make certain observations about factors which may
be present but remain unannounced.
A brief word about the availability of source material. A major
set of published arbitration awards dates back only eleven years
and comprises about twenty-six volumes. 13 Unlike the usual set of
law reports these reports are incomplete in their coverage. Arbitrators
have ordinarily taken the position that the publication of the award
is subject to the consent of the parties. There are both companies and
unions with a fixed policy against publication. The basis for such a
rigid policy is not clear. For these reasons there are undoubtedly
many excellent opinions that remain in arbitrators' files. In many
instances the arbitrator himself does not want the particular opinion
published and he may not even ask the parties to consent to publica-
tion. Occasionally one of the parties sends an award to a publisher.
However, because the arrangement is largely consensual the reports
available are incomplete. Notwithstanding the lack of uniform and
complete reporting of arbitration awards, enough opinions are pub-
lished to afford a good cross-section of the nature and type of most
important problems.
Assuming the question the arbitrator has to decide is arbitrable,
but is not covered specifically in the contract, what can he draw upon
for his decision? He can use statutes or decisions, he can rely upon
the doctrine of stare decisis; that is, he can consider himself bound
by earlier awards, he can sometimes base his opinion upon practice
and custom in the particular industry or bargaining unit, he can
put his own powers of logical thought and reasoning to work on the
problem, he may rely upon general policy considerations, or upon
13. The set referred to is BNA's Labor Arbitration Reports. Opinions are
also printed in Prentice-Hall's Labor Arbitration Service.
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emotional reaction, or, as is sometimes the case, he may not disclose
the basis or reason for his choice either in his opinion or to himself.
14
In discussing the use of various criteria it is necessary to note that
lines are not easy to draw and frequently an arbitrator will use more
than one of these resources in deciding a question. Another caveat in
trying to ascertain the method in arbitration opinions is that the use
made of these criteria varies. One arbitrator may base his opinion
directly upon a statute while another, passing upon a similar question,
may use the statute by way of analogy to the type of problem before
him. Another will find that the reasons underlying the particular
rule of law are equally applicable to the type of dispute now before
him and therefore he will apply the rule because it is a reasonable way
to settle a dispute of this nature.
The following discussion uses arbitration opinions by way of ilus-
tration and any exhaustive study of all available opinions in terms
of the substantive result or of arbitration method is disclaimed. How-
ever, the excerpts and citations here do represent a reasonable cross-
section of the published opinions of many arbitrators.
Instances of arbitrators apparently applying rules of law are fre-
quent. In Aviation Maintenance Corporation and IAM (Ind.) Arbitra-
tor Aaron had to decide upon the efficacy of certain small print found
on an employment application above the signature of the aggrieved
employee. After stating that the certification was categorical and
extreme he added, "These facts support the general principle appli-
cable to individual contracts between employer and employee, which
is recognized both in law and in equity, that such contracts should
be construed most strongly against the employer." Later in the same
opinion Mr. Aaron adds, "Third, it is well established in law that
whether or not the partial disclosure of facts is materially misleading
depends upon whether the person making the statement knows or
believes that the undisclosed facts might affect the recipient's conduct
in the transaction at hand."'15 In this case it may be said that it was
necessary for Mr. Aaron to apply legal rules to ascertain the relation
between the employee as an individual and the employer, but he is
nevertheless applying "the law" in this respect in order to reach a
decision in the case before him.
A question that arises with discomforting regularity in arbitration
proceedings is who has the burden of proof? Although the arbitrator
may successfully evade the issue in many of the cases, when the evi-
dence is equally balanced on any given issue the decision must take
cognizance of this age-old problem. An example of the temporary
postponement of burden of proof problems is found in the opinion of
14. For an excellent comment on this subject, see Note, The Arbitrator's
Approach to Labor Contract Interpretation, 64 HARV. L. Rzv. 1338 (1951).
15. Aviation Maintenance Corp., 8 Lab. Arb. 261, 268 (1947).
NATURE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
the Impartial Board in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
and CWA (CIO):
In the classic treatise on the law of evidence by Mr. Wigmore it has
been well pointed out that the question of who has the burden of proof
arises only after all the evidence is in, and after the trier of the facts has
determined that the evidence is precisely and equally balanced. In such
case he is required to find the issue against him who had the burden of
proof. In view of the fact that such situation may never arise in the
trial of these cases (where Arbitrator finds an exact and precise balance)
we think it would be merely to anticipate a difficulty that might never
arise, for us to make a ruling at this time. (This was an ad hoc stipula-
tion which provided that NLRB cases shall be considered and that other
arbitration precedents may be considered.)16
Subsequently the board facing the problem mentioned decided that
the burden of proof was upon the employer to show just cause in the
discharge cases.17 Arbitrator Pollack reached the same result on a
somewhat broader basis: "In discharge cases arising under a contract
it has generally been held that the burden of proof rests on the em-
ployer to justify the dismissal. This is consistent with the American
tradition that a person should not be considered a wrongdoer until
proof establishes his guilt."'18 In an earlier opinion Arbitrator Whitton
was even more positive in his views of the process: "First, I find the
burden of proof to be on the company. The collective bargaining
process implies a system of industrial jurisprudence operating within
a framework of substantive and procedural rules of law. The parties
are bound to observe the sanctity of contracts, to deal fairly and
frankly with one another, and are subject to all applicable statutes and
principles of common law. The arbitrator is the court of last resort in
the process and should follow generally accepted procedural rules in
arriving at his decision."'19 Again in discussing discharge of an em-
ployee it appears that Arbitrator McCoy is applying procedural rules
of law when he says: "The Company has assumed that burden, as
a matter of affirmative defense, in other cases, and I think properly so.
The defense is in the nature of limitations, which is always a matter
of affirmative plea and proof. '20 Arbitrator Platt found his authority
in a state court decision, thus: "In a case of discharge, the burden of
proof rests upon the company to show, by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, that the discharge of an employee was for good and sufficient
cause. Sarri v. G. C. Bates & Associates, 311 Mich. 624. Upon due con-
sideration of the entire record, the arbitrator finds that this burden
16. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 85, 88 (1955).
17. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 270, 274 (1955).
18. F. J. Kress Box Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 401, 405 (1955).
19. American Optical Co., 4 Lab. Arb. 288, 292 (1946).
20. International Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 775, 778 (1951).
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has not been met by clear and convincing proof and that the extreme
penalty of discharge was not justified."'21
Arbitrators have also turned to legal rules in discussing the quantum
of proof. It seems to be pretty generally accepted among the arbi-
trators that the burden of proof is upon the company to show just
cause in discharge cases.22 When the discharge is for conduct that
also amounts to a crime then the arbitrators are asked to decide what
amount of proof is necessary to meet this burden. In many cases of
this type the arbitrators have unhesitatingly required the employer
to establish that the employee was guilty of the acts alleged beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Closely akin to such problems is the existence of the presumption
of innocence. "A basic concept of our American System of Juris-
prudence is that one accused shall be presumed innocent until proven
guilty by proper and competent evidence. Mere accusations and un-
supported charges are certainly not evidence."23
One arbitrator, asked to pass upon the reasonableness of the union's
action in removing a member, refused to pass on the question because
of the rule used by courts that such review is limited to violations of
law or public policy, breaches of contract, or violation of the union
constitution or by-laws. After announcing his decision on the above
basis, he added, "'more than mere precedent justifies this doctrine."24
Another direct approach is found in an opinion by Arbitrator Liven-
good: "Deeply rooted in the American tradition of justice is the con-
cept of double jeopardy-the principle that a man shall not be twice
punished, or even exposed more than once to the risk of punishment,
for the same offense. It seems to me that principle has been violated
here."
25
In one interesting case an employee was discharged for carrying a
knife in violation of company rules. The issue at the hearing generat-
ing the most discussion was whether or not the company had been
justified in making a search of the employee's locker and whether or
not it was entitled to base its case upon the evidence adduced by this
search. A rather extended quote is here set out because this opinion
is an excellent example of direct application of legal rules in arbitra-
tion proceedings:
To the majority members of the arbitration committee, the adoption
of the aforementioned procedure by the company guards represented a
serious error in judgment and invaded the personal rights of the aggrieved.
In certain respects, the tactic bordered on that of entrapment since the
aggrieved's innocence of the company's objective or of her own rights
21. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 254, 262-63 (1945).
22. See ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 164-68 (1952).
23. A.C. & C. Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 538, 540 (1955) (Scheiber).
24. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 Lab. Arb. 31, 35 (1947) (Wallen).
25. Durham Hosiery Mills, 24 Lab. Arb. 356, 358 (1955).
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placed her honesty and good will at the disposal of the company and
caused her to incriminate herself. Such self-incrimination has long been
outlawed by the basic law of the United States, specifically, under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the precedent-making Su-
preme Court decisions in the noted Search and Seizure Cases. In the
present case, the entire episode was confined to the premises of the com-
pany, but the aggrieved's locker and purse continue inviolate as the
private realm of the individual and are not to be searched or seized in an
illegal fashion. . . . Constructive as the rule is, [company rule against
carrying knives] both in purpose and practice, its positive qualities
need not be vitiated by resort to police methods which infringe upon
the basic residual rights of the individual under our constitutional sys-
tem. Under the circumstances, the majority members conclude that the
evidence of the possession of the knife is inadmissible, and, conse-
quently, the discharge of the aggrieved was unjustified.
26
Other instances of the direct application of law in arbitration decision-
making are not rare.27 The most usual case is that in which the arbi-
trator relies upon either the National Labor Relations Act or the
Fair Labor Standards Act.28 Reliance upon the former raises the in-
triguing question of what application will be made of the pre-emption
doctrine in an arbitration case where the arbitrator is obviously apply-
ing the provisions of the NLRA to settle a dispute between the
parties.
29
All the cases mentioned above, in form anyway, apply a rule of
law or statute directly to the arbitration problem as a standard for
decision or a direct method of decision. Such examples are numerous
and easier to find than the cases discussed later where the arbitrator
specifically refuses to be guided by or to apply a rule of law.
However, there are a goodly number of cases in which the arbitrator
discusses a rule of law but does not base his decision upon that rule.
These cases are distinguished from those discussed above because,
although the arbitrator formulates the rule he does not apply it, but
makes his decision on some independent ground using the rule as a
guide or reference.
The following excerpt from an opinion of Arbitrator Maggs shows
a situation in which the arbitrator was guided by the rule of law-
not a direct application of the rule to the case at hand:
Even in court proceedings, it has now become customary for judges
frequently to reserve rulings on motions which if granted would dispose
of the whole case. Submission of a case to a jury for its verdict is
now, in the federal courts, subject to a later ruling by the judge upon
26. Campbell Soup Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 27, 31 (1946) (Lohman)
27. Grayson Heat Control, Ltd., 2 Lab. Arb. 335 (1945) (Prasow); Ford
Motor Co. (1944) (Schulman), reported in SCHULMAN AND CHAMBERLAIN,
CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 1014 (1949).
28. See, e.g., cases cited note 27.
29. See United Electrical Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st
Cir. 1956), 35 TExAs L. REv. 275.
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a motion for a directed verdict, even though decision on that motion
was not expressly reserved. (Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50). The
reasons for this development in court procedure apply with greater
force to labor-arbitration procedure. . . . Labor arbitrations should cer-
tainly not be shackled by a procedure less flexible than the modern, re-
vised, court procedure. Expeditious disposition of cases is more essential
in labor arbitrations than in court proceedings. 30
In another case in which Arbitrator Lewis was deciding an issue raised
by objection to certain evidence as hearsay he made this pertinent
statement:
It is clear that in informal proceedings of the character of the present
matter, the technical rules of evidence of the common law do not bar the
hearing of such testimony. However, its evaluation for probative value
may properly take into consideration, its inherent credibility, and its
failure of opportunity for cross-examination: in short the reasons calling
for the existence of a hearsay rule in common law jury actions should
at least guide the judgment of the arbitrator in the evaluation of the
weight, if any, to be attributed to such evidence in an arbitration pro-
ceeding.31
Another arbitrator paying heed to the rules of evidence states his
reservation in this form: "But as of today the experience with this
type of trial [arbitration] does not yet permit a complete or facile
carryover of normal rules of evidence to the arbitration process."
32
In the cases involving discharge of an employee for acts which are
criminal, the arbitrator frequently considers the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain the discharge. Here are found good examples of
using a rule as a guide. Arbitrators usually find that the company must
sustain the burden of showing that the employee is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. In so doing they generally discuss the effect of
sustaining the charge upon the employee's future opportunity and
the collateral effects upon his family, and emphasize the difference be-
tween being fired for non-criminal offenses and discharge for a
criminal offense.33 In such determination the arbitrator is guided by
the criminal law, but he rarely applies the rule without explanation.
Typical of this use of legal doctrine as a guide is the statement of
Arbitrator McCoy in a discharge case: "In other words, the act here
was malum prohibitum rather than malum in se, to use a distinction
in the criminal law-bad only because prohibited, not bad in itself."34
30. Caledonia Mills, Inc., 15 Lab. Arb. 474, 477 (1950).
31. Continental Paper Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 727, 728 (1951).
32. Swift and Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 108, 113 (1948) (Healy).
33. General Refractories Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 470, 481 (1955) (Hale); Marlin
Rockwell Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 728, 729 (1955) (Somers); Fruehauf Trailer
Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 832 (1954) (Murphy).
34. International Harvester Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1190, 1193 (1949). See also
Dirilyte Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 639, 641 (1955) (Kelliher); Mather Spring Co.,
13 Lab. Arb. 878, 879 (1949) (Trotta).
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Arbitrators do not uniformly apply or use legal doctrine in making
their decisions. There are numerous examples of cases in which the
arbitrator expressly refuses to apply a particular rule. However, in
such cases it is necessary to distinguish situations in which the arbi-
trator merely thinks that the rule in question does not apply from
those cases in which the arbitrator indicates that legal doctrine is
inappropriate in an arbitration decision. An example of the former
view is found in an opinion by Arbitrator Brecht in which he was
faced with the question of admissibility of statements by persons em-
ployed as checkers. The checkers rode the busses of the employer and
watched the fare collections of the employees driving the busses. The
checkers did all their work without being identified. The employer did
not want to bring the checker to the arbitration proceeding because
his future usefulness would be substantially impaired. In deciding
whether the management should be required to produce the checker
rather than his statement the arbitrator said: "In ordinary circum-
stances due process of law would require the direct testimony of the
checker, but it is felt that the unique elements of his service justify
his nonappearance in this case."35 The view that particular areas of
the law have no application in arbitration proceedings is indicated
by Arbitrator Wirtz in the following passage from an award in a
discharge case: "The Union's cry of 'double-jeopardy' is only an at-
tempt to construct a technicality on which to base its case. The techni-
calities of criminal law are a poor guide to labor relations, and the
particular rule relied on here is obviously inapplicable. '36 Arbitrator
McCoy in a more recent case expressed his views as follows: "There
was a time when the criminal law was so technical that even on a
given set of facts a conviction of larceny would be set aside on the
ground that those facts constituted embezzlement, and vice versa.
Arbitration should not be tied up with such technicalities."3 7
As frequently as arbitrators rely upon legal doctrine as a standard
of judgment when making a choice they will rely upon other arbitra-
tion opinions. This tendency is more pronounced in recent years as
the reporting of arbitration opinions has become more comprehensive
and the total quantity of reported arbitration awards has increased.
The fact that arbitrators use a system of stare decisis in making awards
is significant, but more important is how the arbitrator uses the prior
award. A proper application of the doctrine of stare decisis would
require that an arbitrator consider himself bound by a prior award
made in a proceeding between the same company and the same union
involving substantially the same question. This is distinct from the
35. Shenango Valley Transp. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 362, 365 (1954).
36. International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 610, 613 (1949).
37. Esso Standard Oil Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 495, 498 (1952). See also John R.
Evans & Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 145, 150 (1955) (Abersold).
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case in which the arbitrator is faced with a prior award made between
the same parties under the same contract; in this event something
nearer to the doctrine of res judicata would seem called for. In arbi-
tration the arbitrator is more often faced with a prior award between
one of the parties and another union or another company, or a prior
award between parties completely disassociated from the present
parties, but nevertheless discussing the same or a substantially similar
question. Many examples of each of these uses of prior awards can
be readily found. But in most opinions no distinction is made between
different types of precedent. Another matter for investigation is the
use made of the prior awards-in some instances the arbitrator uses
these materials as controlling authority, in other instances he uses
the prior award as persuasive because the reasoning found therein
is appropriate in considering the question before him.
A few examples of variant use of prior awards in arbitration will
give flavor to the above remarks on stare decisis. The direct use of
stare decisis is illustrated by the following excerpt from an opinion of
Arbitrator Wolff: "In making a determination of whether an em-
ployee is properly classified, the Appeal Board must recognize the 'wide
skill band' premise on which the Corporation's classification pattern is
based. [citing earlier decision made in dispute between the same union
and the same company]."38 Arbitrator McCoy expresses a similar view
in these terms: "The former grievance decided by Mr. Latture was
submitted under a submission agreement that the award should be
final and binding on both the company and the union. I, therefore,
cannot go behind the award in that case. For the purpose of deciding
the grievance before me, it must be taken as settled that a work load
change was instituted in violation of the contract. ' 39 This statement by
Arbitrator McCoy may fit more properly within the class of cases
analogous to the rule of res judicata. The example supplied by Arbi-
trator Kerr shows the recognition of earlier awards by a restatement
thereof with qualification: "The Impartial Chairman finds that on
earlier occasions arbitrators under this contract have accepted cases
for rehearing. The granting of rehearings, however, should be rare
and the burden of proof is on the party requesting the rehearing. '40
In one instance the arbitrator used the rule of a previous arbitration
between the same company and a different union as controlling the
criteria for a later award stating his premise thus: "In an arbitration
between this same company and Local 234, Building Service Em-
ployees' Union (AFL), Duluth, Minn., involving the suspension of a
guard, in which this arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, the rule
38. Chrysler Corp. (1945) (Wolff), reported in SCHULMAN AND CHAMBERLAIN,
CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 750, 752 (1949).
39. Pacific Mills, 3 Lab. Arb. 144, 145 (1946).
40. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 7 Lab. Arb. 757 (1947).
[ VOL. 10
NATURE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
involved in this type of case was stated in the following language:
[quoting from that opinion]. 'The evidence in this case must be tested
and considered under that rule.' "41 The converse of this situation, i.e.,
an arbitrator using a rule from a case between the same union and
another employer, has not been located.
In certain situations it is appropriate to consider other opinions and
awards in the same industry which are important because of the
similarity of the company's endeavor. Such a use was made by Arbi-
trator Naggi in a case involving Standard Oil of Indiana: "The dis-
charge penalty for violation of the no smoking rules is firmly estab-
lished in practice and upheld in arbitration both for the industry and
refinery."
42
More often an arbitrator in using prior awards as a measure for his
decision will make no distinctions based upon parties or the type of
industry involved but will simply use prior awards as a point of
departure if the question in the earlier case was substantially similar
to the one at hand. On many issues arbitrators as a group have not
been uniform in their conclusions. In such a situation an arbitrator
cannot simply elect one view or another without further explanation.
Arbitrator Smith demonstrates the technique ably:
While there is no certainty that this is the prevailing view among
arbitrators . . .it seems reasonable and proper to hold that alleged mis-
conduct of a kind which carries the stigma of general social disapproval
as well as disapproval under accepted canons of plant discipline should
be clearly and convincingly established by the evidence. Reasonable
doubts raised by the proofs should be resolved in favor of the accused.
This may mean that the employer will at times be required, for want
of sufficient proof, to withhold or rescind disciplinary action which in
fact is fully deserved, but this kind of result is inherent in any civilized
system of justice.43
In many instances the arbitrator finds that a particular question has
been so often decided in the same way that there can be very little
doubt of the proper choice. In such instances the arbitrator frequently
states the proposition without specific citation of prior awards. This
approach is shown in the following excerpt from an opinion of Arbi-
trator Rader: "An examination of the provisions of Article VI leads
to the conclusion that it is the standard type of grievance procedure
provision in use throughout the United States in collective bargaining
agreements. In practically all major industries arbitration is provided
for as the final step in the grievance procedure. And the interpretation
placed on such provisions is that one or more grievances may be sub-
41. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 2 Lab. Arb. 633, 634 (1944) (Gorder).
42. Standard Oil of Ind., 19 Lab. Arb. 795, 797 (1952).
43. Kroger Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 906, 908 (1955).
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mitted in arbitration in one session and be heard by the same arbi-
trator."
44
In an interesting series of arbitrations between Southern Bell and
the CWA (CIO) the stipulation covering all cases submitted provided
that in making decisions the arbitration board and the individual
arbitrators should consider other arbitration decisions. Using this
mandate the board did in fact make use of the "arbitration law. '45
There has been much discussion of the use of the doctrine of stare
decisis in arbitration proceedings. Most of the discussion indicates
that the doctrine should be used with caution rather than advocating
a disregard of prior awards in reaching decisions. Occasionally, how-
ever, one party will insist that the award be on the particular facts
without reference to precedent. Arbitrators are in fact using the
doctrine of stare decisis and this is particularly noticeable in reading
recent awards and opinions.
46
At law, contracts are interpreted in the light of the circumstances
and customs of the trade. In ascertaining intent, past practices are
usually material. When an arbitrator refers to past practices it is
difficult to ascertain whether he is merely following the usual rules
of contract construction or whether he is using a rule for decision in
arbitration proceedings. This theoretical difficulty gives way, however,
to the fact that in deciding cases the arbitrators do look to past practice
as a guide. Opinions involving a reliance upon past practice seem to
fall into two classifications: past practice between these same parties
as establishing a pattern, and cases of general practices in industry or
recognized personnel practices.
Three brief quotations from recent awards serve to illustrate the
use by arbitrators of past practices between the parties. Arbitrator
Jacobs had this to say as a background to decision: "A union-manage-
ment contract is far more than words on paper. It is also all the oral
understandings, interpretations and mutually acceptable habits of
action which have grown up around it over the course of time."
47
A somewhat different approach was taken by Arbitrator Bernstein as
follows: "The submission agreement has placed upon this arbitration
board the burden of determining whether Relations gave the Company
'just cause' to discharge him. Beyond these two broad and indefinite
words, the parties' collective bargaining agreement affords no guide.
Hence we must look elsewhere for criteria alongside which to measure
management's action in this case. There are two sources: the written
disciplinary system as embodied in the Company Rules and their ad-
44. St. Joseph Lead Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 441, 443 (1953).
45. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 270, 274 (1955) (McCoy).
46. See American Saw & Tool Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 534, 536 (1954) (Warns);
United Press Ass'n, 22 Lab. Arb. 679, 683 (1954) (Spiegelberg); Carolina
Coach Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 451, 455 (1953) (Livengood).
47. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 197, 198 (1947).
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ministration as exemplified by other cases. '48 It may be that the arbi-
trator is referring to other cases as meaning other arbitrations between
the parties, but it is believed that he was referring to other disciplinary
cases as a matter of company practice. The third opinion demonstrat-
ing past practice between the parties as a basis for choice is one of
Arbitrator Shulman's in which he makes this statement: "Here there
is no classification in the Spring and Upset building for polishing other
than the one involved. No other negotiated classification in that build-
ing is more applicable. By long standing practice that is the right
classification .... -49
Frequently the arbitrator will not confine himself to practices be-
tween the parties to the arbitration proceeding but will look to prac-
tices in industry generally. Such an approach was taken by Arbitrator
Feinberg in deciding whether or not he was empowered to hear more
than one grievance at a single hearing: "Moreover, the practice of
having several grievances heard by one arbitrator being well estab-
lished in industrial relations, it would seem that any intent of the
parties to the contrary should be clearly expressed."5 0 The same arbi-
trator in an earlier case involving a problem about the timeliness of
an award made these remarks: "The impartial chairman has been
advised by the parties that at no time during their labor-relations
history has an award of an arbitrator been attacked on the ground
that it was not rendered within one week although it was not unusual
for such award to be issued more than one week after hearing. The
experience of the present impartial chairman is of the same nature.
It seems clear to the impartial chairman, therefore, that the custom
and practice of the parties has been to disregard this provision in their
contract."51 Perhaps more often the arbitrator will use practice in
industry generally in aid of some other measure of his choice as did
Arbitrator Ferguson in the following statement: "This conclusion
gives a reasonable interpretation of the language used by the parties
in the agreement. Various legal principles and general customs in the
field of labor relations support this finding."52
In addition to relying upon legal rules or statutes and relying upon
arbitration precedent or custom, arbitrators may base their ultimate
choice upon a process of reasoning or the inherent logic of the situa-
tion. The use of reasoning or logic in solving a problem is of course
not unique to the arbitration process and it is probably an element of
any rational decision-making process. It is for this reason that specific
examples of the use of logic or reasoning are difficult to find in isola-
48. Douglas Aircraft Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 331, 333 (1953).
49. Ford Motor Co., (1943) (Schulman), reported in SCHULMAN AND CHAM-
BERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 777, 779 (1949).
50. American Hardware Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 588, 590 (1954).
51. Modernage Furniture Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 314, 315 (1946) (Feinberg).
52. Servel, Inc., 1 Lab. Arb. 163, 164 (1945).
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tion. Applying the standards or criteria for decision in each case
involves an amount of discrimination which is a by-product of logical
thought. Examples of all of the classical forms of logical argument
are readily available in the opinions of arbitrators. This excerpt from
an opinion of Arbitrator Baab illustrates the use of the reductio ad
absurdum: "Literally, the employee had committed no violation of
rules from the end of June to the 10th of October-a period three
months and ten days in length. But it is not reasonable to include a
two week period in which the shop was not in operation and in which
there was no opportunity for an employee to establish any kind of
a record, either good or bad. Hence it must be concluded that the
violation slip of October 10 was the second one within a three month
period .... -93
Not infrequently the arbitrator will decide at least in part on the
basis that any other choice would be against public policy. Courts
have traditionally assumed the burden of ascertaining public policy
and electing certain results in order to avoid violating that public
policy which they have found. It is interesting that in deciding the
disposition of a grievance upon the basis of a general or specific public
policy the arbitrator may be recognizing that his functions as a deci-
sion-maker run beyond the immediate interests of the parties by whom
he is employed to make his decision. This facet of the arbitrator's job
is significant-when he bases a decision upon public policy, whether
expressed or not, he is assuming a responsibility to society, and if he
impliedly recognizes this duty he cannot at the same time deny that
society has certain rights and interests in the arbitration process.
A good statement of the use of public policy as a basis for decision is
found in an opinion of Arbitrator Lesser wherein he is discussing the
propriety of discharging a bus driver: "Consideration was given to the
union's contention that the company did not comply with the agree-
ment by failing to file a charge in writing against Mr. Mauro. The
arbitrator is inclined to go along with the union on this but believes
that the question of public safety is far more weighty than one involv-
ing the failure to notify Mr. Mauro in writing. 5 4
In many other instances the reliance upon policy is not so clearly
expressed. Some arbitrators use what may be called emotional words
in writing their opinions. The terms referred to are abstractions which
in many instances could front for notions of public policy. One is
reluctant to assume that the terms are evidence of pure visceral re-
action to a given question, but on the other hand it would be difficult
to argue that there is not an element of emotion in the decision of
53. Electric Storage Battery Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 118, 121 (1951). See also
American Rolling Mill Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 410, 416 (1948) (Killingsworth);
Continental Can Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 65 (1945) (McCoy).
54. Hudson County Bus Owners Ass'n, 3 Lab. Arb. 786, 787 (1946).
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any controversy. Such terms as "justice,"55 "sound labor relations,"
56
"patently wrong,"57 "fairness,"5 8 "establish a dangerous precedent,"59
and "common sense,"60 indicate in part a use of concepts of public
policy and perhaps emotional reaction to a given question. Such in-
herently subjective abstractions are useful, but in many instances
indicate a decision that has been reached without full and conscious
application of a given set of criteria. Such use of subjective abstrac-
tions is common with judges, and objectionable principally in that it
tends to block communication between the decision-maker and his
reader.
CONTRACT DRAFTING AND DECISION-MAKING
Assuming for the moment that the above discussion of the tools
and standards used by arbitrators in reaching their decisions is
valid, at least in part, what does this mean to the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining contract? Would it be advisable for them, recognizing
that the arbitrators must at times use standards not anticipated in
the contract, to supply him with the standards they desire, either in
the contract or in the stipulation? Any attempt to control the process
of reaching a decision in this way would be confronted with two im-
mediate difficulties. First, negotiations concerning the drafting of
any clause or clauses embodying standards for decision would perhaps
take longer than the contract period. In considering such a task a
party would think in terms of specific cases and, although favoring
application of legal rules in one area, would be violently opposed to
following such rules in another set of circumstances. It is well known
that today's "strict" constructionists may tomorrow insist on a "liberal"
construction of the contract. A second difficulty is that it is probably
impossible to embody all of the rules of decision in an overall-pocket
size document designed for daily use by a great many people. It is
also open to question whether in drafting a contract it would be pos-
sible to do more than make certain standards permissible or make
other standards specifically excluded. Decision-making is in the final
choice largely subjective and an attempt at such control would
probably be as futile as the present use of the clause discussed above.61
55. Armstrong Cork Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 13 (1954) (Williams).
56. Bethlehem Steel Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 194 (1945) (Shipman).
57. Kroger Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1065 (1949) (Blair).
58. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 112 (1947) (Taylor);
North American Aviation, Inc., 17 Lab. Arb. 715 (1951) (Komaroff).
59. Cit-Con Oil Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 186 (1955) (Morvant).
60. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. 199 (1954) (Brecht);
John Lucas & Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 344 (1952) (Reynolds).
61. See McDonald, How Business Men Make Decisions, Fortune, Aug., 1955,
where it is stated that business men make their important decisions subcon-
sciously.
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CONCLUSION
The process of reaching a decision in labor-management arbitra-
tions involves many uncertain factors. As to the final result in a case,
we can perhaps say that it is in accord with the contract of the parties
or that it is not; that it is "fair" or not; "practical" or unworkable; or
that it accords with "public policy" or violates it. Some or all of the
criteria discussed in this article may be satisfied in a particular case,
but, as is proper, the parties are most often interested in basic equities,
in whether an award can be brought within the ambit of their con-
tract, and whether it will work in their daily relationships. But, all
these considered, thousands of awards attest that, when the parties
believe the arbitrator has understood the facts and the contract, and
reached a decision that is logical and practical they will accept it with-
out complaint. Few realize fully, however, how often a decision must
be based on somewhat incomplete information, and the difficulty the
arbitrator has in satisfying himself that the award is correct beyond
all doubt.
